Every major disruption operation against the RU/CIS ransomware ecosystem since 2019, scored 1-5 for what it actually achieved: neutralization, degradation, displacement, or nothing. The question this page answers: which authorities' actions degrade the ecosystem, and which just move it. Source of truth: data/scoreboard.json; methodology in section 06.
Average effectiveness of each authority's operations. Co-led operations credit every named authority; averages exclude too-recent (TBD) actions. Rows with fewer than 3 scored actions carry a small-sample flag.
| Avg score ↕ | Authority | Actions ↕ | Neutralized | Failures | Signature action | Pattern |
|---|
Outcome distribution across all scored operations, the operations the ecosystem simply absorbed, and how fast each layer reconstitutes after a hit.
Displacement watch: operations scored 2 or lower
| Date | Operation | Score | Where it went |
|---|
Reconstitution speed by layer
| Event | Recovery time | Layer | Conf. |
|---|
Pattern: Russian-language financial infrastructure reconstitutes in 1-14 days when personnel are untouched. Recovery time scales with personnel exposure, not with the size of the seizure.
All scored operations. Click any row for the full assessment: action components, personnel outcome, measured impact, and score rationale. Every row links to a primary source.
| Date ↕ | Operation | Target | Authorities | Score ↕ | Outcome | Conf. | Src |
|---|
What the scored record shows. Each finding states its evidence, confidence, and the leverage implication.
Scoring scale
| Score | Label | Definition |
|---|
Second dimension: monetization capability (v1.4)
From the November 2026 revision, operations are additionally graded on monetization capability: the target's internal ability to convert compromises into paid ransoms, scored only where internal leak data or on-chain evidence exists (shown in the row detail; a blank field means no evidence base, not no effect). Leak-site survival and relaunch speed are treated as presence signals only. The motivating case: LockBit 4.0 panel data shows Operation Cronos cut compromise-to-payment conversion from 54.1 percent to 11.5 percent while 75 affiliate accounts and an active leak blog made the group look alive (Gray et al., eCrime 2025; Castano et al., 2025, same leak). The LockBit 3.0 baseline comes from a different source than the 4.0 panel, so the two rates may not be like for like; treat the size of the drop as credible, not confirmed.
Measurement caveats
Leak-site counts measure disclosure, not attacks: about 59 percent of attacks on large and medium firms are invisible even combining police reports, the lead IR firm and leak sites, an observed-to-true multiplier of about 2.4x (Meurs et al., Journal of Quantitative Criminology 2026, Dutch data 2019-2022). Paid victims largely vanish from leak sites, so a post-takedown dip in posts is not proof of a dip in attacks. Designation-type instruments are also structurally late: sanctions arrive on average 727 days after a group's first victim, usually after the group has stopped or rebranded (Meurs et al., eCrime 2024).
Rules
The unit of analysis is the operation, not the press release: coordinated multi-authority actions are one row, and every named lead authority is credited with that row's score. Averages exclude operations under roughly 90 days old (marked TBD), because reconstitution takes weeks to observe. Individual arrests are recorded inside their parent operation's personnel outcome rather than as separate rows.
Re-score policy
Scores are not static. A brand that resurfaces, a successor that reaches material scale, or a fugitive brought into custody triggers a re-score at the next revision, in either direction. Each revision is dated and the workbook behind this page preserves the full history.
Confidence and sources
Confirmed primary source (official press release, court filing) or multiple credible sources. Credible single reputable vendor or media source. Assessments and inferences are labeled as such in the row detail. Every operation links to at least one primary source.
Independence
This scoreboard is independent research. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or informed by non-public material from any government or law enforcement agency. Scoring reflects publicly observable outcomes: whether the target kept operating, how fast it recovered, and whether anyone was held accountable. Corrections are welcome and will be applied with a dated note.