Executive Summary and Group Overview
REvil, tracked in the antivirus industry as Sodinokibi (abbreviated Sodin), was one of the most prolific and financially damaging ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations of the 2019 to 2021 period. The malware first appeared on April 17, 2019, deployed against Oracle WebLogic servers through CVE-2019-2725, and reached its peak with the July 2021 Kaseya VSA supply-chain attack, which pushed ransomware to roughly 1,500 downstream businesses simultaneously behind a 70 million US dollar universal-decryptor demand.
The operation is assessed as a direct continuation of GandCrab (Secureworks GOLD GARDEN) by the same or a substantially overlapping core developer set. REvil ran a closed, vetted affiliate program with an advertised 70/30 split, pioneered systematized double extortion, and from June 2020 added data auctions. As of July 2026 it is effectively defunct following FBI-led technical disruption in 2021 and Russian FSB arrests in January 2022, with legal proceedings concluding in Russia across 2024 and 2025.
| Attribute | Detail |
|---|---|
| Tracking designations | PINCHY SPIDER (CrowdStrike), GOLD SOUTHFIELD (Secureworks), G0115 (MITRE ATT&CK), Ransom:Win32/Sodinokibi (Microsoft); REvil / Sodinokibi (Unit 42, Recorded Future) |
| Predecessor | GandCrab, operated by GOLD GARDEN (Secureworks). PINCHY SPIDER references GOLD GARDEN as the GandCrab antecedent |
| Operational model | Closed, vetted RaaS; limited number of affiliate accounts |
| Extortion mechanic | Encryption + data-leak threat (Happy Blog) + data auction (from June 2020) |
| Variants | REvil / Sodinokibi (Windows); REvix (Linux/ESXi, June 2021) |
| Assessed jurisdiction | Russian Federation, safe-harbor model (CONFIRMED behavior; no confirmed state tasking) |
| LE disruption status | FBI key compromise (2021); FSB raids, 25 sites, 14 detained (Jan 2022) |
Lineage and Organizational Heritage
The prevailing cross-vendor assessment is that REvil's core developers are the same individuals, or a substantially overlapping set, who operated the GandCrab RaaS (Secureworks GOLD GARDEN). GandCrab was among the most prolific operations of 2018 to 2019, with operator-claimed revenue exceeding 2 billion US dollars before its announced retirement on May 31, 2019. REvil emerged two months earlier and accelerated immediately afterward. Secureworks, CrowdStrike, McAfee ATR, and Sophos independently corroborate the lineage; Brian Krebs first posited it publicly in June 2019.
GOLD GARDEN (Secureworks) designates the GandCrab operators. GOLD SOUTHFIELD (Secureworks) and PINCHY SPIDER (CrowdStrike) designate the REvil operators; MITRE tracks the group as G0115. Microsoft tracks the malware family as Ransom:Win32/Sodinokibi. Unit 42 and Recorded Future track by the common name REvil / Sodinokibi without a distinct group codename. These are operator-group designations and should not be conflated with malware-family names.
Operational Model
REvil operated a closed, vetted RaaS with a limited-partnership affiliate model. The core GOLD SOUTHFIELD / PINCHY SPIDER team controlled malware development, backend infrastructure, payment processing, and the leak site; affiliates conducted intrusions, deployed the ransomware, and handled initial victim communications. CrowdStrike characterizes this as a "partnership program with a limited number of accounts," distinct from open-recruitment RaaS. Affiliates were recruited on high-tier Russian-language forums (XSS and Exploit) requiring reputation and vetting.
The standard advertised split was 70/30 in favor of the affiliate. AdvIntel and Flashpoint research (September 2021) revealed a cryptographic backdoor in affiliate builds that let core operators hijack victim negotiations, pose as the victim abandoning talks (the "double chat" technique), then resume directly and collect the full ransom, cutting the affiliate out.
- Countdown timer displayed on the victim portal; failure to pay by the deadline doubled the demand.
- Proof of decryption offered: victims could upload two encrypted sample files for free decryption before payment.
- Reduction behavior was standard: Elliptic documented a 50,000 demand negotiated to 25,000 (50% reduction).
REvil systematized double extortion: data exfiltration prior to encryption, then threatened publication on the "Happy Blog" (a deliberately taunting name). From June 2020 it introduced data auctions, offering stolen data to third-party buyers if the victim refused to pay, a primitive third-extortion vector. In the Grubman Shire Meiselas & Sacks breach, operators threatened to sell data to political opponents of then-President Trump, a high-visibility leverage threat that ultimately did not materialize.
Technical Capabilities
| Vector | Detail | CVE / specifics |
|---|---|---|
| Oracle WebLogic | First deployment vector (Apr 2019); unauthenticated deserialization RCE, CVSS 9.8 | CVE-2019-2725 |
| Win32k privilege escalation | Use-after-free to SYSTEM in early samples; 32-bit added in v1.00 | CVE-2018-8453 |
| Kaseya VSA (MSP abuse) | Credential-leak zero-day (versions ≤ 9.5.6); ransomware pushed via legitimate admin channels | CVE-2021-30116 |
| RDP brute force | Publicly exposed RDP servers targeted directly | n/a |
| Backdoored installers | Compromised Italian WinRAR distribution site; weaponized update packages | Supply chain |
| ConnectWise Control | Cloud RMM abused to deploy REvil on compromised hosts | n/a |
| Phishing / malvertising | Malspam and exploit-kit drive-by delivery | n/a |
Hybrid design: Salsa20 symmetric stream cipher for file content, Curve25519 (elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman) for key encapsulation, with SHA-3 and CRC32 hashing and RC4 for runtime string decryption. API resolution uses 32-bit hashes for anti-analysis, and I/O completion ports enable fast asynchronous multithreaded encryption. Shadow copies are deleted via PowerShell/WMI (legacy vssadmin on Windows XP).
REvil implements a CIS keyboard/locale kill switch using GetKeyboardLayoutList, GetUserDefaultUILanguage, and GetSystemDefaultUILanguage. On Russian or other CIS-region layouts or languages, the malware halts without encrypting. This is a deliberate operational-security and legal safe-harbor mechanism consistent with operation from Russian Federation territory, present from early versions.
A Bitdefender universal decryptor (released September 2021 with an undisclosed law enforcement partner) recovers files for all REvil victims encrypted before July 13, 2021, and is distributed free via Bitdefender and the No More Ransom project. By November 2021 more than 1,400 companies in 83 countries had used it, saving an estimated 550 million US dollars. Some later variants are not decryptable. Separately, a REvil developer accidentally generated a master key during the Kaseya response; the FBI obtained it and shared it with Kaseya on July 21, 2021. The Washington Post reported the FBI had secretly accessed REvil servers weeks earlier and withheld keys to protect a planned operation that was never executed because REvil disappeared first.
REvix, a Linux and ESXi variant, was released in June 2021, extending REvil to virtualized infrastructure and VMware environments. This capability was later continued by Ransom Cartel, which used DonPAPI to harvest vCenter credentials before encrypting ESXi-associated files (.log, .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp, .vmsn).
Financial Infrastructure
REvil accepted both Bitcoin and Monero, with a stated preference for Monero (ring signatures, stealth addresses, RingCT). Bitcoin carried a 10% surcharge reflecting higher tracing risk. The Kaseya 70 million US dollar demand notably requested Bitcoin; Elliptic's Tom Robinson attributed this to the difficulty of acquiring that sum in Monero on available exchanges. OFAC confirmed REvil received more than 200 million US dollars in ransom paid in Bitcoin and Monero across documented incidents.
Elliptic published the most detailed REvil-specific tracing (payment lifecycle, layering, exchange mapping). Chainalysis and TRM Labs cover REvil within general ransomware tracking, but no equally prominent REvil-dedicated public case study from those firms was identified.
| Entity / action | Detail | Date |
|---|---|---|
| SUEX OTC, S.R.O. | OFAC-designated for facilitating ransomware transactions (includes REvil flows); majority of known transactions tied to illicit activity | Sep 21, 2021 |
| Chatex | OFAC-designated for facilitating transactions for multiple variants including REvil; direct ties to Suex | Nov 8, 2021 |
| Chatex support entities | IZIBITS OU, Chatextech SIA, Hightrade Finance Ltd. designated for material support | Nov 8, 2021 |
| Polyanin FTX seizure | $6,123,652.21 seized from Yevgeniy Polyanin's FTX Trading account | Sep 10, 2021 |
| DOJ forfeiture | 39.89 BTC and additional USD-denominated funds forfeited, traceable to conspiracy proceeds | 2023 |
Victim Profile and Targeting
REvil ransomware was deployed on approximately 175,000 computers worldwide (OFAC). IBM placed REvil's 2020 profits alone at roughly 123 million US dollars (conservative). Small businesses are estimated to have made up 50 to 75% of victims (Elliptic), handled by affiliates seeking reliable smaller payments, while high-value "big game" targets generated the headline demands. Targeted sectors span technology and MSPs, food and agriculture, legal services, financial services and travel, healthcare, manufacturing and technology hardware, government, and education. Spokesperson UNKN publicly named agriculture as a deliberate future target in October 2020.
- Focus: predominantly the United States, Western Europe, Australia, and Canada; the Kaseya attack affected victims in at least 17 countries.
- CIS exclusion: keyboard/locale kill switch prevents execution on Russian and CIS systems.
- Operational whitelisting: system directories and specific files excluded to preserve negotiability; database, backup, and security processes killed via the prc configuration key.
| Victim | Date | Demand / payment |
|---|---|---|
| 22 Texas municipalities | Aug 2019 | Coordinated supply-chain-style hit |
| Travelex | Dec 2019 | ~$2.3M paid |
| Grubman Shire Meiselas & Sacks | May 2020 | $42M demanded; status unclear |
| Brown-Forman (Jack Daniel's) | Aug 2020 | Terabytes stolen; status unclear |
| Acer | Mar 2021 | $50M demanded (record at the time) |
| Quanta Computer / Apple | Apr 2021 | Apple schematics used as direct leverage |
| JBS Foods | May–Jun 2021 | $11M paid in Bitcoin |
| Kaseya VSA (supply chain) | Jul 2021 | $70M demanded; ~1,500 downstream victims |
Law Enforcement and Regulatory Response
Yaroslav Vasinskyi ("Rabotnik"), Ukrainian national: arrested in Poland on October 8, 2021; 11-count indictment unsealed November 8, 2021 (Northern District of Texas); extradited March 2022; pleaded guilty August 2022. Sentenced May 1, 2024 to 13 years and 7 months and ordered to pay 16 million US dollars in restitution for 2,500+ attacks demanding over 700 million US dollars.
Yevgeniy Polyanin, Russian national: indicted November 8, 2021 on the same counts (maximum exposure 145 years); 6.1 million US dollars seized from his FTX account. Remains a fugitive on the FBI Cyber Most Wanted list (believed to be in Barnaul, Russia) as of March 2026; Russian citizenship makes extradition highly unlikely.
Under Operation GoldDust (17 countries, Europol, Eurojust, INTERPOL), authorities arrested five Sodinokibi/REvil affiliates and two GandCrab suspects. Two REvil affiliates were arrested in Romania on November 4, 2021. On January 14, 2022 the Russian FSB, acting on a U.S. request, raided 25 locations across Moscow, St. Petersburg, and surrounding oblasts, detaining 14 individuals.
| Cohort | Individuals | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| October 2024 | Artem Zayets (4.5y), Aleksey Malozemov (5y), Ruslan Khansvyarov (5.5y), Daniil Puzyrevsky (6y, assessed leader) | Penal-colony terms; Puzyrevsky and Khansvyarov reported serving, convictions upheld on appeal |
| June 2025 | Andrey Bessonov, Mikhail Golovachuk, Roman Muromsky, Dmitry Korotayev | Convicted of carding fraud; released on time served |
This corrects earlier summaries that described six June 2025 releases: verified reporting shows two cohorts of four. Current custody status of the October 2024 cohort is not fully resolved in open sources.
- OFAC designated Vasinskyi and Polyanin (Nov 8, 2021), Chatex plus support entities (Nov 8, 2021), and SUEX OTC (Sep 21, 2021). Alexander Ermakov was sanctioned Jan 22, 2024 (Medibank hack) as "linked to the Russia-backed cybercrime gang REvil."
- U.S. State Department: up to 10 million US dollars for information on key REvil leadership; up to 5 million for information leading to arrest/conviction of any participant.
Attribution and State Nexus
No direct nexus to Russian state intelligence (FSB, SVR, or GRU) has been established by any government authority or major vendor. REvil is consistently assessed as a financially motivated criminal organization operating under implicit Russian state tolerance rather than as a directed state asset. The "safe harbor" framing (criminals operating freely from Russian territory with implicit non-interference) is well supported; active state tasking is not confirmed.
| Indicator | Assessment |
|---|---|
| CIS exclusion behavior | Consistent with operating from Russian territory and avoiding domestic scrutiny; a safe-harbor marker, not state direction |
| Historical non-prosecution | Two-plus years of Russian inaction despite U.S. pressure indicates a permissive environment, not active sponsorship |
| FSB action (Jan 2022) | Explicitly U.S.-requested and timed to a pre-invasion diplomatic window; assessed as partly a diplomatic gesture |
| Russian charges | Card fraud rather than ransomware: Moscow neither acknowledged the full scope nor fully shielded the operatives |
| White House statements | Noted occasional collaboration between some perpetrators and Kremlin security agencies, but attributed no specific REvil tasking |
Trajectory Assessment
- Jul 13, 2021: first disappearance, triggered by FBI infrastructure compromise.
- Sep 2021: Happy Blog and payment portals restored; operations briefly resumed.
- Late Oct 2021: second disappearance after the Vasinskyi arrest and multinational pressure.
- Apr 2022: anomalous Happy Blog reappearance (Oil India content; 80/20 "join us" page); did not develop into a sustained operation. Actor attribution never publicly confirmed.
Two-tier confidence: the GandCrab anchor is assessed separately from downstream extension claims.
| Group | Relationship | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| GandCrab / GOLD GARDEN | Predecessor; operational continuity / rebrand | High (Secureworks, McAfee, Sophos) |
| LV Ransomware / GOLD NORTHFIELD | Code theft: a REvil v2.03 beta binary reconfigured; no personnel overlap | High for code; none for personnel |
| Ransom Cartel | Probable former affiliate/associate with source-code access; not a direct rebrand | Moderate; single primary vendor (Unit 42) |
| DarkSide | Shared affiliate pool noted by FireEye/Mandiant; no confirmed operator coordination | Moderate |
| Conti | Contemporaneous competitor; former REvil affiliates reportedly moved to LockBit post-backdoor | Contextual |
- Trajectory: rising sharply through H1 2021 (up to 42% of known victims post-Kaseya), then abrupt collapse. No voluntary wind-down signals; REvil was at its commercial peak when disrupted.
- Definitive exit: the January 2022 FSB raids; the FSB stated the gang "ceased to exist." No credible reconstitution under the REvil name has been confirmed since.
- Gaps: the UNKN spokesperson and principal developers remain publicly unidentified; the FSB-named "ringleader" was never publicly named; Polyanin remains at large; the full Ermakov/Medibank-to-REvil network relationship is undocumented.