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Threat Actor Profile: Compiled July 2026
REvil (Sodinokibi)
Ransomware-as-a-Service  •  Double Extortion  •  GandCrab Lineage  •  Disrupted
Critical (Historical) Disrupted / Defunct RaaS
First Observed
Apr 2019
Oracle WebLogic (CVE-2019-2725)
Operational Status
Defunct
Since Jan 2022
Systems Affected
~175,000
OFAC / Treasury
Ransom Collected
$200M+
BTC and XMR (OFAC)
Peak Share
~42%
Post-Kaseya (Recorded Future)
Decryptor
Available
Bitdefender / No More Ransom
Lineage
GandCrab
GOLD GARDEN predecessor
01

Executive Summary and Group Overview

REvil, tracked in the antivirus industry as Sodinokibi (abbreviated Sodin), was one of the most prolific and financially damaging ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations of the 2019 to 2021 period. The malware first appeared on April 17, 2019, deployed against Oracle WebLogic servers through CVE-2019-2725, and reached its peak with the July 2021 Kaseya VSA supply-chain attack, which pushed ransomware to roughly 1,500 downstream businesses simultaneously behind a 70 million US dollar universal-decryptor demand.

The operation is assessed as a direct continuation of GandCrab (Secureworks GOLD GARDEN) by the same or a substantially overlapping core developer set. REvil ran a closed, vetted affiliate program with an advertised 70/30 split, pioneered systematized double extortion, and from June 2020 added data auctions. As of July 2026 it is effectively defunct following FBI-led technical disruption in 2021 and Russian FSB arrests in January 2022, with legal proceedings concluding in Russia across 2024 and 2025.

AttributeDetail
Tracking designationsPINCHY SPIDER (CrowdStrike), GOLD SOUTHFIELD (Secureworks), G0115 (MITRE ATT&CK), Ransom:Win32/Sodinokibi (Microsoft); REvil / Sodinokibi (Unit 42, Recorded Future)
PredecessorGandCrab, operated by GOLD GARDEN (Secureworks). PINCHY SPIDER references GOLD GARDEN as the GandCrab antecedent
Operational modelClosed, vetted RaaS; limited number of affiliate accounts
Extortion mechanicEncryption + data-leak threat (Happy Blog) + data auction (from June 2020)
VariantsREvil / Sodinokibi (Windows); REvix (Linux/ESXi, June 2021)
Assessed jurisdictionRussian Federation, safe-harbor model (CONFIRMED behavior; no confirmed state tasking)
LE disruption statusFBI key compromise (2021); FSB raids, 25 sites, 14 detained (Jan 2022)
Data Leak Site & Branding
Imagery note: REvil's Tor "Happy Blog" leak site and victim portal were dismantled in 2021 to 2022 and are not live. Data-leak-site and ransom-note screenshots are held by vendor reporting (BleepingComputer, SOCRadar, Trellix) on client-rendered pages that could not be retrieved with source provenance in this session. The panels below use confirmed public-domain U.S. Government imagery of the named, indicted operators. Vendor DLS and ransom-note screenshots can be added when a browser session is connected or the fetch service recovers.
02

Lineage and Organizational Heritage

Assessed Connection to GandCrab
Confirmed: four vendors independently corroborate

The prevailing cross-vendor assessment is that REvil's core developers are the same individuals, or a substantially overlapping set, who operated the GandCrab RaaS (Secureworks GOLD GARDEN). GandCrab was among the most prolific operations of 2018 to 2019, with operator-claimed revenue exceeding 2 billion US dollars before its announced retirement on May 31, 2019. REvil emerged two months earlier and accelerated immediately afterward. Secureworks, CrowdStrike, McAfee ATR, and Sophos independently corroborate the lineage; Brian Krebs first posited it publicly in June 2019.

Vendor framing nuance: CrowdStrike frames the transition as a single actor evolving from GandCrab into REvil (the PINCHY SPIDER adversary). Secureworks frames it more narrowly as GOLD GARDEN transferring the GandCrab source code to GOLD SOUTHFIELD in April 2019. Both support continuity; the distinction (identical personnel versus a source-code handoff between related groups) is not fully resolved in open sources.
Evidentiary Pillars
Pillar 1: High
Code Overlap
Secureworks CTU identified a near-identical string-decoding function shared by GandCrab and REvil. URL-building logic was specific enough that reproducing it would require access to GandCrab source code.
Pillar 2: High
Beta Code Artifacts
Early REvil beta samples contained strings "gcfin" (assessed: GandCrab Final) and "gc6" (GandCrab 6), suggesting REvil began development as GandCrab version 6 before rebranding.
Pillar 3: High
Timing Correlation
REvil shipped as an additional payload alongside GandCrab on April 17, 2019. GandCrab retired May 31, 2019. REvil activity accelerated and expanded delivery methods immediately post-retirement.
Pillar 4: Moderate
CIS Exclusion Fingerprint
Both implement near-identical keyboard/locale checks to avoid CIS hosts. A common practice in isolation, but the implementation specifics match, reinforcing the other pillars.
Vendor Designation Disambiguation

GOLD GARDEN (Secureworks) designates the GandCrab operators. GOLD SOUTHFIELD (Secureworks) and PINCHY SPIDER (CrowdStrike) designate the REvil operators; MITRE tracks the group as G0115. Microsoft tracks the malware family as Ransom:Win32/Sodinokibi. Unit 42 and Recorded Future track by the common name REvil / Sodinokibi without a distinct group codename. These are operator-group designations and should not be conflated with malware-family names.

03

Operational Model

RaaS Structure

REvil operated a closed, vetted RaaS with a limited-partnership affiliate model. The core GOLD SOUTHFIELD / PINCHY SPIDER team controlled malware development, backend infrastructure, payment processing, and the leak site; affiliates conducted intrusions, deployed the ransomware, and handled initial victim communications. CrowdStrike characterizes this as a "partnership program with a limited number of accounts," distinct from open-recruitment RaaS. Affiliates were recruited on high-tier Russian-language forums (XSS and Exploit) requiring reputation and vetting.

Revenue Split and the Affiliate Backdoor
Credible: AdvIntel / Flashpoint, corroborated by forum disputes

The standard advertised split was 70/30 in favor of the affiliate. AdvIntel and Flashpoint research (September 2021) revealed a cryptographic backdoor in affiliate builds that let core operators hijack victim negotiations, pose as the victim abandoning talks (the "double chat" technique), then resume directly and collect the full ransom, cutting the affiliate out.

Structural weakness: An affiliate publicly sought 21.5 million US dollars in stolen commissions from REvil on the Exploit forum in May 2021. LockBit representatives later stated former REvil affiliates confirmed being defrauded. The revelation left REvil having victimized both external targets and its own criminal partners, a durable reputational liability. The April 2022 reappearance advertised an improved 80/20 split, plausibly to rebuild affiliate trust.
Negotiation Behavior
Avg. Ransom (H1 2021)
$2.25M
Industry avg. then: ~$850K (Unit 42)
Demand Range
$25K–$70M
SMB floor to Kaseya universal demand
Bitcoin Surcharge
10%
Monero preferred for traceability
Deadline Effect
2x demand
On countdown-timer expiry
  • Countdown timer displayed on the victim portal; failure to pay by the deadline doubled the demand.
  • Proof of decryption offered: victims could upload two encrypted sample files for free decryption before payment.
  • Reduction behavior was standard: Elliptic documented a 50,000 demand negotiated to 25,000 (50% reduction).
Double and Triple Extortion

REvil systematized double extortion: data exfiltration prior to encryption, then threatened publication on the "Happy Blog" (a deliberately taunting name). From June 2020 it introduced data auctions, offering stolen data to third-party buyers if the victim refused to pay, a primitive third-extortion vector. In the Grubman Shire Meiselas & Sacks breach, operators threatened to sell data to political opponents of then-President Trump, a high-visibility leverage threat that ultimately did not materialize.

04

Technical Capabilities

Initial Access Vectors
Confirmed: all three CVEs verified against NVD
VectorDetailCVE / specifics
Oracle WebLogicFirst deployment vector (Apr 2019); unauthenticated deserialization RCE, CVSS 9.8CVE-2019-2725
Win32k privilege escalationUse-after-free to SYSTEM in early samples; 32-bit added in v1.00CVE-2018-8453
Kaseya VSA (MSP abuse)Credential-leak zero-day (versions ≤ 9.5.6); ransomware pushed via legitimate admin channelsCVE-2021-30116
RDP brute forcePublicly exposed RDP servers targeted directlyn/a
Backdoored installersCompromised Italian WinRAR distribution site; weaponized update packagesSupply chain
ConnectWise ControlCloud RMM abused to deploy REvil on compromised hostsn/a
Phishing / malvertisingMalspam and exploit-kit drive-by deliveryn/a
Encryption Scheme

Hybrid design: Salsa20 symmetric stream cipher for file content, Curve25519 (elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman) for key encapsulation, with SHA-3 and CRC32 hashing and RC4 for runtime string decryption. API resolution uses 32-bit hashes for anti-analysis, and I/O completion ports enable fast asynchronous multithreaded encryption. Shadow copies are deleted via PowerShell/WMI (legacy vssadmin on Windows XP).

Backdoor foundation: Each file is encrypted with a unique key derived from a victim-specific public key, but the attacker's master public key is embedded in every binary. This let the REvil core decrypt any victim independently of affiliates, the cryptographic basis of the double-chat backdoor.
CIS Exclusion Behavior
Confirmed: Malpedia, Intel 471

REvil implements a CIS keyboard/locale kill switch using GetKeyboardLayoutList, GetUserDefaultUILanguage, and GetSystemDefaultUILanguage. On Russian or other CIS-region layouts or languages, the malware halts without encrypting. This is a deliberate operational-security and legal safe-harbor mechanism consistent with operation from Russian Federation territory, present from early versions.

Decryptor Availability
Confirmed: Bitdefender, No More Ransom

A Bitdefender universal decryptor (released September 2021 with an undisclosed law enforcement partner) recovers files for all REvil victims encrypted before July 13, 2021, and is distributed free via Bitdefender and the No More Ransom project. By November 2021 more than 1,400 companies in 83 countries had used it, saving an estimated 550 million US dollars. Some later variants are not decryptable. Separately, a REvil developer accidentally generated a master key during the Kaseya response; the FBI obtained it and shared it with Kaseya on July 21, 2021. The Washington Post reported the FBI had secretly accessed REvil servers weeks earlier and withheld keys to protect a planned operation that was never executed because REvil disappeared first.

Linux / ESXi Variant

REvix, a Linux and ESXi variant, was released in June 2021, extending REvil to virtualized infrastructure and VMware environments. This capability was later continued by Ransom Cartel, which used DonPAPI to harvest vCenter credentials before encrypting ESXi-associated files (.log, .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp, .vmsn).

05

Financial Infrastructure

Payment Model

REvil accepted both Bitcoin and Monero, with a stated preference for Monero (ring signatures, stealth addresses, RingCT). Bitcoin carried a 10% surcharge reflecting higher tracing risk. The Kaseya 70 million US dollar demand notably requested Bitcoin; Elliptic's Tom Robinson attributed this to the difficulty of acquiring that sum in Monero on available exchanges. OFAC confirmed REvil received more than 200 million US dollars in ransom paid in Bitcoin and Monero across documented incidents.

On-Chain Laundering Methodology (Elliptic)
1
Layering
Ransom payments split across multiple wallets and mixed with Bitcoin from other sources to break the direct link to the victim payment.
2
Transaction Chaining
Funds passed through many intermediate addresses to obscure the chain of custody before reaching cash-out points.
3
Phased Cash-Out
Laundering remained active weeks after payment in documented cases, indicating a deliberate, staged approach through complicit exchanges.
Credible: Elliptic is the primary REvil-specific blockchain-forensics source

Elliptic published the most detailed REvil-specific tracing (payment lifecycle, layering, exchange mapping). Chainalysis and TRM Labs cover REvil within general ransomware tracking, but no equally prominent REvil-dedicated public case study from those firms was identified.

Implicated Exchanges and Seizures
Entity / actionDetailDate
SUEX OTC, S.R.O.OFAC-designated for facilitating ransomware transactions (includes REvil flows); majority of known transactions tied to illicit activitySep 21, 2021
ChatexOFAC-designated for facilitating transactions for multiple variants including REvil; direct ties to SuexNov 8, 2021
Chatex support entitiesIZIBITS OU, Chatextech SIA, Hightrade Finance Ltd. designated for material supportNov 8, 2021
Polyanin FTX seizure$6,123,652.21 seized from Yevgeniy Polyanin's FTX Trading accountSep 10, 2021
DOJ forfeiture39.89 BTC and additional USD-denominated funds forfeited, traceable to conspiracy proceeds2023
06

Victim Profile and Targeting

Scale and Sector Profile

REvil ransomware was deployed on approximately 175,000 computers worldwide (OFAC). IBM placed REvil's 2020 profits alone at roughly 123 million US dollars (conservative). Small businesses are estimated to have made up 50 to 75% of victims (Elliptic), handled by affiliates seeking reliable smaller payments, while high-value "big game" targets generated the headline demands. Targeted sectors span technology and MSPs, food and agriculture, legal services, financial services and travel, healthcare, manufacturing and technology hardware, government, and education. Spokesperson UNKN publicly named agriculture as a deliberate future target in October 2020.

Geography and Exclusions
  • Focus: predominantly the United States, Western Europe, Australia, and Canada; the Kaseya attack affected victims in at least 17 countries.
  • CIS exclusion: keyboard/locale kill switch prevents execution on Russian and CIS systems.
  • Operational whitelisting: system directories and specific files excluded to preserve negotiability; database, backup, and security processes killed via the prc configuration key.
Notable Victims
VictimDateDemand / payment
22 Texas municipalitiesAug 2019Coordinated supply-chain-style hit
TravelexDec 2019~$2.3M paid
Grubman Shire Meiselas & SacksMay 2020$42M demanded; status unclear
Brown-Forman (Jack Daniel's)Aug 2020Terabytes stolen; status unclear
AcerMar 2021$50M demanded (record at the time)
Quanta Computer / AppleApr 2021Apple schematics used as direct leverage
JBS FoodsMay–Jun 2021$11M paid in Bitcoin
Kaseya VSA (supply chain)Jul 2021$70M demanded; ~1,500 downstream victims
07

Law Enforcement and Regulatory Response

U.S. Indictments and Sentencing

Yaroslav Vasinskyi ("Rabotnik"), Ukrainian national: arrested in Poland on October 8, 2021; 11-count indictment unsealed November 8, 2021 (Northern District of Texas); extradited March 2022; pleaded guilty August 2022. Sentenced May 1, 2024 to 13 years and 7 months and ordered to pay 16 million US dollars in restitution for 2,500+ attacks demanding over 700 million US dollars.

Yevgeniy Polyanin, Russian national: indicted November 8, 2021 on the same counts (maximum exposure 145 years); 6.1 million US dollars seized from his FTX account. Remains a fugitive on the FBI Cyber Most Wanted list (believed to be in Barnaul, Russia) as of March 2026; Russian citizenship makes extradition highly unlikely.

Multinational Arrests and FSB Action

Under Operation GoldDust (17 countries, Europol, Eurojust, INTERPOL), authorities arrested five Sodinokibi/REvil affiliates and two GandCrab suspects. Two REvil affiliates were arrested in Romania on November 4, 2021. On January 14, 2022 the Russian FSB, acting on a U.S. request, raided 25 locations across Moscow, St. Petersburg, and surrounding oblasts, detaining 14 individuals.

Charge narrowing: Russian charges were limited to illegal circulation of means of payment and use/distribution of malware. The indictment excluded the major ransomware episodes (JBS, Kaseya, Acer): defendants were effectively charged with card fraud against Americans, reflecting the breakdown in U.S.-Russia cooperation after the Ukraine invasion.
Russian Sentencing (2024 to 2025)
Credible: Recorded Future (The Record), TASS/Kommersant reporting
CohortIndividualsOutcome
October 2024Artem Zayets (4.5y), Aleksey Malozemov (5y), Ruslan Khansvyarov (5.5y), Daniil Puzyrevsky (6y, assessed leader)Penal-colony terms; Puzyrevsky and Khansvyarov reported serving, convictions upheld on appeal
June 2025Andrey Bessonov, Mikhail Golovachuk, Roman Muromsky, Dmitry KorotayevConvicted of carding fraud; released on time served

This corrects earlier summaries that described six June 2025 releases: verified reporting shows two cohorts of four. Current custody status of the October 2024 cohort is not fully resolved in open sources.

Sanctions and Rewards
  • OFAC designated Vasinskyi and Polyanin (Nov 8, 2021), Chatex plus support entities (Nov 8, 2021), and SUEX OTC (Sep 21, 2021). Alexander Ermakov was sanctioned Jan 22, 2024 (Medibank hack) as "linked to the Russia-backed cybercrime gang REvil."
  • U.S. State Department: up to 10 million US dollars for information on key REvil leadership; up to 5 million for information leading to arrest/conviction of any participant.
08

Attribution and State Nexus

Assessment
Confirmed: no directed state nexus established

No direct nexus to Russian state intelligence (FSB, SVR, or GRU) has been established by any government authority or major vendor. REvil is consistently assessed as a financially motivated criminal organization operating under implicit Russian state tolerance rather than as a directed state asset. The "safe harbor" framing (criminals operating freely from Russian territory with implicit non-interference) is well supported; active state tasking is not confirmed.

Indicators and Basis
IndicatorAssessment
CIS exclusion behaviorConsistent with operating from Russian territory and avoiding domestic scrutiny; a safe-harbor marker, not state direction
Historical non-prosecutionTwo-plus years of Russian inaction despite U.S. pressure indicates a permissive environment, not active sponsorship
FSB action (Jan 2022)Explicitly U.S.-requested and timed to a pre-invasion diplomatic window; assessed as partly a diplomatic gesture
Russian chargesCard fraud rather than ransomware: Moscow neither acknowledged the full scope nor fully shielded the operatives
White House statementsNoted occasional collaboration between some perpetrators and Kremlin security agencies, but attributed no specific REvil tasking
Evidentiary gap: No public court document, OFAC designation, or advisory asserts a directed intelligence-sharing or tasking relationship between REvil core operators and Russian services. OFAC's January 2024 Ermakov designation describes a link to the "Russia-backed cybercrime gang REvil," implying reputational continuation of the network rather than confirmation of historical state direction.
09

Trajectory Assessment

Disappearance and Return Cycles
  • Jul 13, 2021: first disappearance, triggered by FBI infrastructure compromise.
  • Sep 2021: Happy Blog and payment portals restored; operations briefly resumed.
  • Late Oct 2021: second disappearance after the Vasinskyi arrest and multinational pressure.
  • Apr 2022: anomalous Happy Blog reappearance (Oil India content; 80/20 "join us" page); did not develop into a sustained operation. Actor attribution never publicly confirmed.
Connected Group Cluster

Two-tier confidence: the GandCrab anchor is assessed separately from downstream extension claims.

GroupRelationshipConfidence
GandCrab / GOLD GARDENPredecessor; operational continuity / rebrandHigh (Secureworks, McAfee, Sophos)
LV Ransomware / GOLD NORTHFIELDCode theft: a REvil v2.03 beta binary reconfigured; no personnel overlapHigh for code; none for personnel
Ransom CartelProbable former affiliate/associate with source-code access; not a direct rebrandModerate; single primary vendor (Unit 42)
DarkSideShared affiliate pool noted by FireEye/Mandiant; no confirmed operator coordinationModerate
ContiContemporaneous competitor; former REvil affiliates reportedly moved to LockBit post-backdoorContextual
Single-source flag (Ransom Cartel): the linkage rests on a single primary technical source (Unit 42, with MalwareHunterTeam's initial identification). No corroborating second-source technical assessment was identified, and neither Mandiant nor Recorded Future has published a formal Ransom Cartel to REvil equivalence assessment. Treat as a working hypothesis (ANALYST INFERENCE).
Trajectory Indicators and Intelligence Gaps
  • Trajectory: rising sharply through H1 2021 (up to 42% of known victims post-Kaseya), then abrupt collapse. No voluntary wind-down signals; REvil was at its commercial peak when disrupted.
  • Definitive exit: the January 2022 FSB raids; the FSB stated the gang "ceased to exist." No credible reconstitution under the REvil name has been confirmed since.
  • Gaps: the UNKN spokesperson and principal developers remain publicly unidentified; the FSB-named "ringleader" was never publicly named; Polyanin remains at large; the full Ermakov/Medibank-to-REvil network relationship is undocumented.

Sources

Government and Law Enforcement
[1]DOJ: Ukrainian Arrested and Charged with Ransomware Attack on Kaseya (Nov 8, 2021): justice.gov
[2]DOJ: Sodinokibi/REvil Affiliate Sentenced for Role in $700M Ransomware Scheme (May 1, 2024): justice.gov
[3]U.S. Treasury OFAC: designations of Vasinskyi, Polyanin, Chatex, and Suex (Sep–Nov 2021); Ermakov (Jan 2024): treasury.gov
[4]FBI Cyber Most Wanted: Yevgeniy Igorevich Polyanin (imagery, public domain): fbi.gov
[5]Europol: Five Affiliates to Sodinokibi/REvil Unplugged (Operation GoldDust, Nov 8, 2021): europol.europa.eu
Vendor and Technical Reporting
[6]Secureworks CTU: GOLD SOUTHFIELD and GOLD GARDEN threat profiles: secureworks.com
[7]CrowdStrike: The Evolution of PINCHY SPIDER from GandCrab to REvil: crowdstrike.com
[8]MITRE ATT&CK: GOLD SOUTHFIELD, Group G0115: attack.mitre.org
[9]Cisco Talos: Sodinokibi Ransomware Exploits WebLogic Server Vulnerability: talosintelligence.com
[10]Bitdefender: Free Universal Decryptor for REvil/Sodinokibi (Sep 2021); No More Ransom: bitdefender.com
[11]Elliptic: REvil ransomware payment tracing and laundering analysis: elliptic.co
[12]Flashpoint / AdvIntel: REvil affiliate cryptographic backdoor and double-chat analysis (Sep 2021)
[13]Palo Alto Unit 42: Ransom Cartel Ransomware, A Possible Connection with REvil (Oct 2022): unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
[14]Intel 471: REvil RaaS structure and affiliate model; Malpedia REvil version history
CVE / Vulnerability Records
[15]NVD: CVE-2019-2725 (Oracle WebLogic deserialization RCE): nvd.nist.gov
[16]NVD: CVE-2018-8453 (Win32k use-after-free EoP): nvd.nist.gov
[17]NVD / DIVD CSIRT: CVE-2021-30116 (Kaseya VSA credential disclosure): csirt.divd.nl
Media and Sentencing Reporting
[18]The Record (Recorded Future): Russia releases REvil members after carding convictions (Jun 2025): therecord.media
[19]The Record (Recorded Future): Four REvil members sentenced to prison (Oct 2024): therecord.media
[20]The Washington Post: FBI secretly accessed REvil servers and obtained decryption keys (2021)